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Transmission characteristics ofMERS and SARS
in the healthcare setting: a comparative study
Gerardo Chowell1,2*, Fatima Abdirizak1, Sunmi Lee3, Jonggul Lee4, Eunok Jung4, Hiroshi Nishiura5,6
and Cécile Viboud2
Abstract
Background: The Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) coronavirus has caused recurrent outbreaks in the Arabian
Peninsula since 2012. Although MERS has low overall human-to-human transmission potential, there is occasional
amplification in the healthcare setting, a pattern reminiscent of the dynamics of the severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) outbreaks in 2003. Here we provide a head-to-head comparison of exposure patterns and transmission dynamics
of large hospital clusters of MERS and SARS, including the most recent South Korean outbreak of MERS in 2015.
Methods: To assess the unexpected nature of the recent South Korean nosocomial outbreak of MERS and estimate the
probability of future large hospital clusters, we compared exposure and transmission patterns for previously reported
hospital clusters of MERS and SARS, based on individual-level data and transmission tree information. We carried out
simulations of nosocomial outbreaks of MERS and SARS using branching process models rooted in transmission tree
data, and inferred the probability and characteristics of large outbreaks.
Results: A significant fraction of MERS cases were linked to the healthcare setting, ranging from 43.5 % for the
nosocomial outbreak in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in 2014 to 100 % for both the outbreak in Al-Hasa, Saudi Arabia, in 2013
and the outbreak in South Korea in 2015. Both MERS and SARS nosocomial outbreaks are characterized by early
nosocomial super-spreading events, with the reproduction number dropping below 1 within three to five disease
generations. There was a systematic difference in the exposure patterns of MERS and SARS: a majority of MERS cases
occurred among patients who sought care in the same facilities as the index case, whereas there was a greater
concentration of SARS cases among healthcare workers throughout the outbreak. Exposure patterns differed slightly by
disease generation, however, especially for SARS. Moreover, the distributions of secondary cases per single primary case
varied highly across individual hospital outbreaks (Kruskal–Wallis test; P < 0.0001), with significantly higher transmission
heterogeneity in the distribution of secondary cases for MERS than SARS. Simulations indicate a 2-fold higher
probability of occurrence of large outbreaks (>100 cases) for SARS than MERS (2 % versus 1 %); however, owing to
higher transmission heterogeneity, the largest outbreaks of MERS are characterized by sharper incidence peaks. The
probability of occurrence of MERS outbreaks larger than the South Korean cluster (n = 186) is of the order of 1 %.
Conclusions: Our study suggests that the South Korean outbreak followed a similar progression to previously described
hospital clusters involving coronaviruses, with early super-spreading events generating a disproportionately large number
of secondary infections, and the transmission potential diminishing greatly in subsequent generations. Differences in
relative exposure patterns and transmission heterogeneity of MERS and SARS could point to changes in hospital practices
since 2003 or differences in transmission mechanisms of these coronaviruses.
Keywords: Coronavirus, Exposure pattern, Hospital transmission, MERS, Middle East, Nosocomial, Reproduction number,
SARS, South Korea
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Background
The Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus
(MERS) is a zoonotic pathogen that has caused recur-
rent spillovers in the human population since March
2012 [1]. A total of 1,047 laboratory-confirmed cases of
infection with MERS including 460 deaths have been
reported in Saudi Arabia alone as of 15 July 2015 [2];
the concentration of human infections in this region is
thought to be linked to the local population of dromedary
camels, which may serve as an intermediate host for
MERS [3, 4]. The human-to-human transmission poten-
tial of MERS is thought to be subcritical [1, 5, 6], although
there is occasional amplification in the healthcare setting
[5, 7–11]. While sporadic importations of MERS to
Europe, Africa, Asia, and North America via returning
travelers from the Middle East had not sparked local
outbreaks until recently, a single importation into South
Korea on 4 May 2015 triggered the largest cluster of cases
outside the Middle East to date [12]. The index patient
was a 68-year-old businessman who visited several coun-
tries in the Middle East before returning to South Korea
via Qatar [13, 14], where he developed respiratory symp-
toms on 11 May 2015. An accurate diagnosis of MERS
was not established until 20 May 2015, after the index pa-
tient had sought treatment in several different healthcare
facilities [13]. A total of 186 MERS infections in South
Korea have been linked to the healthcare facilities visited
by the index patient and subsequent infections. As a result
of this large cluster, more than 6,000 contacts have been
monitored in South Korea [13–15].
Although large-scale community transmission has not
been reported for MERS, large hospital clusters are not
infrequent and can amplify transmission, which aligns
with the transmission characteristics of severe acute re-
spiratory syndrome (SARS), a related coronavirus that
sparked global concern in 2002–2003 [10, 11, 16, 17].
Coronaviruses associated with both syndromes have high
affinity to the lower respiratory tract and cause severe
pneumonia [18–20], particularly among older adults
with underlying medical conditions [21, 22]. Both viruses
are thought to be associated with some degree of trans-
mission heterogeneity, indicating that super-spreading
events are expected [23, 24].
While the individual heterogeneity of MERS (i.e. vari-
ation in the transmissibility by individuals) has been ex-
plored recently [25, 26], here we focus exclusively on
hospital outbreaks, where transmission is amplified. Fur-
ther, we provide the first head-to-head comparison with
SARS and carry out a comparative analysis of the trans-
mission characteristics and exposure patterns of previ-
ously reported hospital clusters of MERS and SARS to
assess the unexpected nature of the recent South Korean
nosocomial outbreak and estimate the probability of
future large hospital clusters.
Methods
We analyzed a variety of epidemiological datasets to quan-
tify the exposure patterns and transmission characteristics
of MERS and SARS by disease generation and in different
settings, including aggregated case counts, individual-
level case data, and detailed transmission trees, as de-
tailed below.
Individual-level case data to quantify exposure patterns
Middle East respiratory syndrome
We analyzed a publicly available line list of MERS cases
reported between March 2013 and May 2015 to the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) Ministry of Health [2].
For each case, we obtained the date of reporting, health-
care worker status, and whether the infection had been
linked to healthcare facilities. Healthcare facilities in KSA
report MERS cases to the Ministry of Health through an
electronic case-reporting system once all appropriate test-
ing is complete [27]. Case confirmation is based on la-
boratory diagnosis through detection of viral nucleic acid
or serology, regardless of the presence of clinical signs and
symptoms [28].
Severe respiratory syndrome
Total SARS case counts for Canada, China, Hong Kong,
Singapore, and Vietnam including cases among health-
care workers were obtained from the World Health
Organization (WHO) website for the outbreaks in 2003
[29]. A probable case of SARS was defined as radio-
graphic evidence of pneumonia or respiratory distress
syndrome on a chest X-ray, positivity for SARS virus in-
fection by one or more laboratory assays, or autopsy
findings consistent with the pathology of respiratory dis-
tress syndrome [30]. A confirmed case was defined
based on a positive laboratory test combined with clin-
ical evidence compatible with SARS.
Transmission trees to quantify transmission
characteristics by generation time
We obtained and analyzed detailed transmission trees
for hospital clusters of MERS and SARS. Transmission
trees provide information on the epidemiological links
between successive cases and allow for quantification of
the reproduction number, R, which is a key parameter in
outbreak investigations. In general, R quantifies the
transmission potential of an infectious pathogen, which
informs the likelihood of large-scale outbreaks [31, 32].
Estimates of R > 1 indicate the potential for an infectious
pathogen to generate a major outbreak while R < 1 indi-
cates that transmission of a given pathogen cannot be
sustained in the population. Here, we note Rg as the
reproduction number at disease generation g, where g ≥
0. If g = 0 then R0 denotes the index reproduction num-
ber, or the number of secondary cases ascribed to the
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index case in a given outbreak. Overall, the reproduction
number is a function of several inter-related factors, in-
cluding the epidemiology of the disease, local cultural
factors, and environmental conditions. Moreover, the
reproduction number is affected by population behavior
changes and control interventions occurring over the
course of an epidemic.
We defined hospital clusters as outbreaks that started
in a healthcare setting with a hospitalized patient (the
index case) and ended when the chain of transmission
subsided and no further infections were linked to the
healthcare setting. We searched for past MERS and
SARS outbreaks with information on types of exposure.
Specifically, we searched PubMed for articles on SARS
published after 1 January 2003 with the search “(SARS
AND hospital) OR (SARS AND healthcare)” and arti-
cles on MERS published after January 2012 with the
search “(MERS AND hospital) OR (MERS AND health-
care).” We also screened relevant articles cited within
selected articles.
Overall, we found information on types of exposure
for nine hospital outbreaks (three MERS and six SARS),
while detailed transmission trees were available for four
of these (two SARS and two MERS clusters) [11, 13, 14,
16, 17, 33, 34]; an ill-defined SARS transmission tree
from Taiwan had to be discarded.
Each case within the hospital cluster was classified ac-
cording to occupational and social exposure, including
healthcare workers, patients, family members and visi-
tors, and non-clinical staff. Healthcare workers were de-
fined as personnel responsible for the direct care of
patients and included physicians, nurses, laboratory
technicians, and emergency medical personnel. Hos-
pital personnel who do not directly work with patients
were categorized as non-clinical hospital staff, a group
that included janitors, clerks, ambulance drivers, and
firefighters.
Transmission tree of MERS hospital cluster in South Korea,
2015
We constructed the transmission tree of the South
Korean outbreak, comprising 186 cases with the last case
reported on 5 July 2015. For this purpose, we employed
publicly available detailed case data from the WHO, the
Korean Centers for Disease Control, and the Ministry of
Health & Welfare of South Korea [13, 14, 33, 34]. The
index patient developed symptoms on 11 May 2015 but
was not diagnosed with MERS until 20 May 2015. This
nosocomial outbreak involved 15 healthcare settings.
While exposure information was available for all cases,
only 168 (91 %) out of 185 transmission links tied to
healthcare settings were ascertained through outbreak
investigations.
Transmission tree of MERS hospital cluster in Al-Hasa, Saudi
Arabia, 2013
We obtained a transmission tree for a nosocomial MERS
outbreak comprising 25 cases that occurred between 1
April 2013 and 23 May 2013 in Al-Hasa, Saudi Arabia
[11]. This nosocomial outbreak involved four healthcare fa-
cilities [11]. Transmission links were inferred for all sec-
ondary cases comprising this outbreak except for one case.
Transmission tree of SARS hospital cluster in Singapore, 2003
We obtained the transmission tree for a nosocomial
SARS outbreak comprising 188 cases in Singapore be-
tween 25 February 2003 and 11 May 2003 [16]. The
index patient was a local resident who developed symp-
toms in late February 2003 and was subsequently admit-
ted to a hospital after returning from a holiday in Hong
Kong. This nosocomial outbreak involved three major
hospitals in Singapore [16].
Transmission tree of SARS hospital cluster in Toronto,
Canada 2003
Detailed information was available on a nosocomial SARS
outbreak in Toronto, Canada [17], resulting in 90 cases
between 23 February 2003 and 15 April 2003 [17]. The
index patient was a traveler returning from Hong Kong
on 23 February 2003. This nosocomial outbreak developed
in a single 249-bed secondary case community hospital
[17]. Infection control precautions were implemented
throughout the hospital including the closing of the hos-
pital to admissions, closing of the outpatient clinics, and
quarantine orders to discharged patients [17].
Ethics
MERS case data from Saudi Arabia were publicly available
from the KSA Ministry of Health [2]. Similarly the dataset
of MERS cases in South Korea was publicly available from
the WHO, the Korean Centers for Disease Control, and
the Ministry of Health & Welfare of South Korea [13, 14,
33, 34]. All of the data were de-identified. These openly
available datasets were generated as part of emerging out-
break investigations and were, therefore, deemed exempt
from institutional review board assessment.
Analytical approach
We tabulated the pathogen-specific frequency of
healthcare and familial exposure using individual-level
data and aggregated case counts. To evaluate differ-
ences in exposure, we used chi-square and Fisher’s
exact tests of independence in a cross-tabulation of
exposure category and outbreak. Transmission trees
allowed for tabulation of exposure frequency and num-
ber of secondary infections by pathogen, individual out-
break (n = 4), and disease generation—the time interval
elapsed between successive generations of cases. Next,
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to quantify and compare the transmission potential and
extent of transmission heterogeneity for MERS and
SARS nosocomial outbreaks, we used an approach re-
cently developed to characterize the distribution of
cluster sizes for subcritical pathogens [35]. A hallmark
of high transmission heterogeneity is a preponderance
of very small and very large clusters (the latter being
associated with super-spreading events), together with a
low frequency of intermediate-size clusters. Based on
this approach, we fit a negative binomial to the distri-
bution of secondary cases obtained from the MERS
and SARS transmission trees and estimated the repro-
duction number R and dispersion parameter k (with lower
values indicating higher heterogeneity) [35]. Armed with
these estimates, we simulated the expected distribution of
future outbreaks that may occur in South Korea or else-
where in terms of final size, peak size, and outbreak dur-
ation. We used branching process models [35] to simulate
5,000 MERS-like and 5,000 SARS-like outbreaks based on
the distribution of secondary cases inferred from empirical
transmission trees. Each simulated outbreak was initiated
with a single infectious individual.
Results
We analyzed the frequency of cases among healthcare
workers for 973 MERS and 7,634 SARS patients
(Table 1). The proportion of MERS cases among health-
care workers was similar in Saudi Arabia and South
Korea (13.4 % versus 13.5 %). The proportion of health-
care workers among SARS cases varied from 19 % in
China to 57 % in Vietnam, and was higher than that for
MERS. The largest MERS outbreaks reported thus far
have been greatly amplified in the healthcare setting,
with the fraction of cases linked to hospitals ranging
from 43.5 % for the 2014 outbreak in Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia, to 100 % for both the 2013 outbreak in Al-Hasa,
Saudi Arabia and the ongoing outbreak in South Korea
(Table 2). The SARS outbreaks in Singapore, Toronto,
China, and Vietnam were also primarily linked to health-
care settings with the proportion of cases tied to hospitals
ranging from 73.5 % in Singapore to 100 % in Toronto
(Table 2).
The transmission trees for the nosocomial MERS and
SARS outbreaks are shown in Fig. 1 while the case pro-
gression by disease generation and exposure category is
shown in Fig. 2. These outbreaks comprised only a few
generations of infections, ranging from three to eight if
the index case is considered to be generation 0. For
MERS, the exposure patterns did not differ between the
outbreaks (chi-square test; P = 0.36; Fig. 3), with the great
majority of cases being patients (62.3–79.0 %) followed by
family members (13–21 %). In contrast, SARS affected a
larger proportion of healthcare workers (33–42 %) and
family members (22–39 %) compared to the MERS out-
breaks (chi-square test; P < 0.001; Fig. 3). There was no
significant difference in relative exposure between the two
SARS outbreaks (chi-square test; P = 0.2).
Of particular concern is the recent MERS outbreak in
South Korea, which comprises a total of 186 cases in-
cluding 25 healthcare workers, 116 patients (including
the index patient), 39 visitors or family members, and 6
non-clinical staff cases (Fig. 1). A total of 30 secondary
cases have been linked to the index patient in the first
generation of the disease, 124 secondary cases have
been reported for the second generation, 24 cases have
been identified for the third generation, and one case
has been reported for the fourth generation. This leads
to a rough empirical estimate of the reproduction num-
ber according to disease generation of 30 for the first
generation, 4.1 for the second generation, 0.2 for the
third generation, and 0.04 for the fourth generation.
The distribution of the individual reproduction num-
bers varied across individual outbreaks (Kruskal–Wallis
test; P < 0.0001), and between MERS and SARS (Wilcoxon
test; P < 0.0001). The reproduction number for the
index case (generation 0) was high for three of the four
outbreaks (range 1–30), including the ongoing out-
break in South Korea (Fig. 3). The reproduction num-
ber of the first two generations of secondary cases
varied significantly for both SARS (median = 2, inter-
quartile range 0.43–2.4) and MERS (range 0–80). For
Table 1 Country-specific total number of cases and cases among healthcare workers for outbreaks of Middle East respiratory
syndrome (MERS) [2, 13, 14, 33, 34] and severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) [29]
Coronavirus Time period Country Total cases Healthcare workers (%)
MERS 20 May–5 Jul 2015 South Korea 186 25 (13.4)
MERS Jan 2013–May 2015 Saudi Arabia 787 106 (13.5)
SARS 23 Feb–12 Jun 2003 Canada 251 109 (43.4)
SARS 16 Nov–3 Jun 2003 China 5,327 1,002 (18.8)
SARS 15 Feb–31 May 2003 Hong Kong 1,755 386 (22.0)
SARS 25 Feb–5 May 2003 Singapore 238 97 (40.8)
SARS 23 Feb–14 Apr 2003 Vietnam 63 36 (57.1)
Information based on publicly available nationally aggregated case counts and patient-level data
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MERS, the reproduction number dropped below 1.0 in
generation 2 for the outbreak in South Korea and gen-
eration 3 for the outbreak in Al-Hasa, whereas it did
not drop below 1.0 until generation 4 for SARS (Fig. 4).
Importantly, for MERS, a large proportion of the sec-
ondary cases were among patients visiting the same
hospital facilities as the index patient in South Korea
(69 %) and Al-Hasa, Saudi Arabia (100 %). Exposure
categories were more balanced for SARS, with 47–57 %
of secondary cases among healthcare workers, 24–30 %
among visitors and family members, and 14–19 % among
patients (Fig. 3).
Based on the transmission trees, one can identify
several early super-spreading events fueling these out-
breaks. The MERS outbreak in South Korea was char-
acterized by three such events, the index patient who
infected 30 secondary cases, and two patient cases of
the second generation who infected 80 and 23 sec-
ondary cases each. In the MERS outbreak in Al-Hasa,
Saudi Arabia, one patient infected seven other pa-
tients in the same hospital. The SARS outbreak in
Singapore was associated with six super-spreading
events of at least seven secondary cases each, whereas
the SARS outbreak in Toronto was characterized by
four super-spreading events of at least seven second-
ary cases each.
Next, we quantified transmission heterogeneity in
these nosocomial outbreaks through the dispersion par-
ameter k, which in turn allowed us to predict the size of
future outbreaks of MERS (or SARS, should it reappear).
By fitting a negative binomial distribution to the number
of secondary cases in empirical transmission trees of
realized outbreaks, we derived estimates of the mean
reproduction number and the dispersion parameter
(Table 3). The reproduction number indicates the aver-
age number of secondary cases per index case, while the
dispersion parameter quantifies the degree of heterogen-
eity in the distribution of secondary cases. A lower value
of k indicates more pronounced heterogeneity. Both
MERS and SARS had reproduction numbers close to 1.0
in the hospital setting, although the estimate for MERS
had broad confidence intervals, presumably due to
smaller sample size. We found the dispersion parameter
for MERS to be significantly lower than that for SARS,
indicating higher heterogeneity in the distribution of
secondary cases for nosocomial MERS outbreaks com-
pared to SARS, and, in turn, a higher probability of
super-spreading events of higher magnitude for MERS.
Outbreak simulations for both MERS and SARS
showed marked variability in outbreak characteristics,
with the distribution of outbreak size, peak size, and out-
break duration following power-laws (Fig. 5). Figure 6
displays the scope of outbreak size and duration for
MERS and SARS directly derived from the joint prob-
ability distribution of outbreak outcomes. For illustration
purposes, the probability of a future outbreak greater
than 100 cases is 1.2 % for MERS and 2.3 % for SARS.
The higher transmission heterogeneity of MERS mani-
fests itself by a more skewed distribution of outbreak
sizes and sharper peaks expected during the largest out-
breaks, relative to SARS (Fig. 5).
While the great majority of outbreak simulations only
comprised a few cases (Fig. 5), a few outbreak simula-
tions for both MERS and SARS demonstrate the poten-
tial for multi-modal outbreaks characterized by larger
total size and duration that result from low-probability
super-spreading events (Additional file 1: Figs. S1 and S2).
Moreover, these simulations are consistent with observed
multi-modal outbreak curves for SARS and MERS as
shown in Additional file 1: Fig. S3. Overall, multi-modal
outbreaks of MERS tend to have higher peak size but
shorter duration.
Table 2 Total cases, cases linked to the healthcare setting, and cases among healthcare workers for individual nosocomial outbreaks
of Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) and severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)
Coronavirus Country Time period Total cases Cases linked to healthcare settings (%) Healthcare workers (%) Sources
MERS South Korea 20 May–5 Jul 2015 186 186 (100) 25 (13.5) [13, 14, 33, 34]
Al-Hasa, Saudi Arabia 1 Apr–23 May 2013 24 24 (100) 2 (8.3) [11]
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia 1 Jan–16 May 2014 225 98 (44) 78 (35.0) [10]
Total MERS nosocomial outbreaks 435 308 (70.8) 105 (24.1)
SARS Singapore 25 Feb–11 May 2003 238 175 (74) 97 (41.0) [16]
Toronto, Canada 23 Feb–15 Apr 2003 216 216 (100) 92 (42.6) [17, 51]
Beijing, China 18 Mar–23 Apr 2003 125 103 (82) 67 (54.0) [52]
Vietnam 26 Feb–28 Apr 2003 63 52 (83) 37 (59.0) [53]
Hong Kong 15 Feb–31 May 2003 1,755 866 (49.3) 405 (23.1) [54]
Taiwan Mar–Jun 2003 668 370 (55.4) 120 (18.0) [37]
Total SARS nosocomial outbreaks 3,065 1782 (58.1) 818 (26.7)
Information was obtained based on a literature search of hospital outbreaks of SARS and MERS
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Discussion
This is the first head-to-head comparison of exposure and
transmission patterns of large hospital clusters of MERS
and SARS, with a focus on the recent May–July 2015
MERS outbreak in South Korea. Nosocomial outbreaks of
both diseases were characterized by high transmission het-
erogeneity, with three to six super-spreading events identi-
fied during the early stages of transmission. Intriguingly,
there was a systematic difference in the exposure patterns
of MERS and SARS, with a majority of MERS cases occur-
ring among patients who sought care in the same facilities
as the index case, and a greater concentration of SARS
cases among healthcare workers throughout the outbreak.
Exposure patterns differed slightly by disease generation,
however, especially for SARS. Although the number of
hospital outbreaks available for study remains limited,
comparison of the distribution of secondary cases suggests
a similar transmission potential within the hospital for
both viruses (R0 close to 1.0), but greater transmission
heterogeneity for MERS than SARS. Our study suggests
that the South Korean outbreak follows a similar progres-
sion to previously described hospital clusters involving
coronaviruses. In these clusters, an early super-spreading
event linked to a single hospitalized index case generated a
disproportionate number of infections, while the transmis-
sion potential diminished greatly in subsequent genera-
tions, indicating a significant effect of active case detection
and control interventions. Our simulations suggest that the
probability of a future hospital outbreak of MERS larger
than the South Korean 2015 outbreak (i.e., >186 cases) is
only of the order of 1 %.
Super-spreading events tied to nosocomial outbreaks of
MERS and SARS have been attributed in part to diagnos-
tic delays, which increase the window of opportunity for
generation of secondary cases in settings with suboptimal
infection control measures [14, 16, 36, 37]. Accordingly,
the index patient of the MERS outbreak in South Korea
was diagnosed 9 days after the onset of symptoms, and
Fig. 1 Transmission trees of Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) and severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreaks linked to health-care
settings. a MERS outbreak in Al-Hasa, Saudi Arabia, from 1 April to 23 May 2013 [11]. b MERS outbreak in South Korea from 20 May to 5 July 2015 [13, 33].
c Nosocomial SARS outbreak in Singapore from 25 February to 11 May 2003 [16]. d Nosocomial SARS outbreak in Toronto from 23 February to 5 April
2003 [17]. Numbers inside the nodes of the tree are used to indicate a group of cases rather than a single case. Colors are used to distinguish the index
case from secondary cases and highlight different exposure categories among secondary cases, including patient, visitor or family member, healthcare
worker, and non-clinical staff working in the hospital
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generated an estimated 30 secondary cases [14]. Similarly,
for the nosocomial SARS outbreak in Singapore, the index
patient infected 22 secondary individuals and was isolated
5 days after admission to the hospital [38]. Furthermore,
for a nosocomial SARS outbreak in Taiwan, the index case
was diagnosed with SARS and admitted to the hospital
6 days after the onset of symptoms, infecting 137 second-
ary SARS cases including 45 healthcare workers [37].
Super-spreading events are the hallmark of a highly hetero-
geneous transmission pathway and are potentially mediated
by individual variation in infectivity (through viral shed-
ding) or in the number of contacts [23]. These characteris-
tics are shared by several directly transmitted infectious
diseases; comparison of the transmission heterogeneity par-
ameter k suggests that nosocomial transmission of MERS
could be more prone to super-spreading events than SARS,
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monkeypox, Ebola, or measles in the post-elimination era
[23, 35, 39, 40]. Additional data on nosocomial MERS out-
breaks would be needed, however, to confirm these find-
ings, especially because heterogeneity may differ between
outbreaks and countries, and decrease after interventions
are put in place [23].
The reproduction number for secondary cases during
transmission chains of MERS in the Middle East has been
estimated to lie below the epidemic threshold at R = 1
[1, 5, 6], whereas past outbreaks of SARS have been char-
acterized by an overall reproduction number between 2
and 3 before interventions were implemented [41, 42].
Based on the distribution of secondary cases in the Al-
Hasa and South Korean outbreaks, we cannot rule out
that the reproduction number of MERS is above 1 in the
healthcare setting, although our confidence intervals are
large. Our estimates, however, are substantially lower than
estimates based on more recent nosocomial outbreak data
from Saudi Arabia [43]. Moreover, a recent analysis of
MERS cluster sizes reported up to 8 August 2013 [25] es-
timated a subcritical R at 0.6 and less heterogeneity than
our study (k = 0.24), perhaps owing to the choice of a
different time period, or reliance on cluster size data ra-
ther than the distribution of secondary cases during hos-
pital outbreaks as in our study. As a result, the expected
probability of large outbreaks is smaller in [25] than in our
study (0.01 % for an outbreak larger than the realized
South Korean one, versus ~1 % in our study). Similar find-
ings were obtained by another study that analyzed the
outcomes of 36 historical MERS importation events ,in-
cluding the recent South Korean outbreak, in terms of
outbreak size and total number of disease generations (R =
0.75 and k = 0.14) [26]. Differences between studies are in
part driven by methodology, because reproduction number
estimates could be inflated in studies that do not account
for transmission heterogeneity. Further, each study focused
on a different subset and time period of the MERS epi-
demic, and to our knowledge our study is the first to dis-
sect transmission dynamics in the hospital setting. Of note,
our approach did not explicitly integrate the effect of in-
creased case detection, contact tracing, and infection con-
trol interventions, which likely helped stamp out the
MERS and SARS outbreaks after a few disease generations.
Overall, while transmission of MERS (and SARS) appears
critical in the hospital setting before active case detection
and interventions are in place, it is thought that the trans-
mission potential of these coronaviruses remains subcrit-
ical in the community [6].
The ongoing South Korean cluster appears to be large
in terms of initial super-spreading events, and we cannot
rule out a different transmission potential of MERS in
South Korea owing to particular climatological condi-
tions, characteristics of the hospital system, and cultural
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Table 3 Estimates of the reproduction number and the
dispersion parameter k of Middle Eastern respiratory syndrome
(MERS) and severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in the
hospital
Coronavirus Mean R (95 % CI) k (95 % CI)
MERS 0.91 (0.36, 1.44) 0.06 (0.03, 0.09)
SARS 0.95 (0.67, 1.23) 0.20 (0.13, 0.27)
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factors, including the tendency of family members and
visitors to be involved in the nursing work of hospital-
ized relatives [44]. Interestingly, we found that the rela-
tive exposure patterns differed between SARS and
MERS, with a higher frequency of healthcare workers
for SARS, and a predominance of patients visiting the
same hospital as the index case for MERS. For both
pathogens, family members came second in terms of risk
category. These differences would be worth investigating
further because they could signal an improvement in
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healthcare worker precautions since the SARS outbreak
in 2003, different patient care habits in South Korea
characterized by higher involvement of family members,
or slightly different routes of transmission for these two
coronaviruses.
Our findings derived from the comparative analysis of
nosocomial outbreaks of MERS and SARS indirectly sup-
port the need for rapid case detection, enhanced and sus-
tained infection control measures, and effective isolation
and quarantine strategies in order to prevent or promptly
control potential MERS and SARS outbreaks, which is in
line with past modeling studies of the transmission dy-
namics of SARS in 2003 [41, 42, 45–48]. These measures
include droplet precautions, e.g., wearing surgical masks,
and contact precautions, e.g., wearing gown and gloves in
the patients’ room [49]. In addition, the super-spreader
events that are key to amplify nosocomial transmission of
MERS and SARS outbreaks [23] support the adoption of
airborne precautions that include at least six hourly air
changes in treatment rooms [50]. A thorough investiga-
tion of the transmission pathways from a single index case
to 30 secondary cases in healthcare settings in South
Korea is needed.
Our study is not exempt of limitations. First, our data
from South Korea may be prone to right censoring, as fur-
ther transmission events stemming from individuals under
quarantine or currently hospitalized individuals cannot be
ruled out in the near future. However, the outbreak ap-
pears to be on an imminent path to extinction given that
no new cases have been reported in South Korea since 4
July 2015. Second, we were not able to characterize risk of
infection according to exposure category in absolute terms
(e.g., healthcare workers, patients, visitors) because rele-
vant denominator data were not available for secondary
cases. For this reason, we focused our analysis on relative
comparisons of exposure categories between individual
outbreaks, disease generations, and virus types. Third, we
focused on outbreaks with detailed transmission trees,
and thus, contact-tracing activities must have been effect-
ively carried out during those outbreaks, which may in
turn have affected subsequent exposure and transmission
patterns. Overall, most methods used to quantify trans-
mission potential and transmission heterogeneity are
prone to reporting biases, especially because larger clus-
ters and more severely ill patients tend to be overly repre-
sented in any surveillance dataset [1, 6, 24]. However,
large hospital outbreaks that persist for several generations
are worth studying because they offer a useful window on
the distribution of secondary cases, for a particularly im-
portant subset of the epidemic.
Conclusion
We have carried out a first head-to-head comparison of
exposure and transmission patterns for large hospital
clusters of MERS and SARS, including the most recent
May–July 2015 MERS outbreak in South Korea. Our
findings confirm the importance of super-spreading
events in the healthcare setting for the transmission dy-
namics of both coronaviruses, an effect that may be even
more pronounced for MERS than SARS. As a result,
large outbreaks of MERS, although rare, can happen and
can generate very sharp incidence peaks that may be dif-
ficult to control. Differences in the relative exposure of
the two viruses could signal changes in hospital health-
care practices over time and/or different mechanisms of
transmission, which would be worth investigating fur-
ther. Our data are consistent with the benefits of rapid
case detection and strict adherence to infection control
measures, which can rapidly reduce the risk of super-
spreading events and therefore the size of the nosoco-
mial outbreaks [10, 11, 16, 17]. More broadly, our study
emphasizes the importance of individual patient data
and transmission tree information to dissect the progres-
sion of subcritical outbreaks of key interest. Overall, the
South Korean experience with MERS underscores the po-
tential risk of importation of emerging infectious diseases
into other regions of the world and the need to better
understand the cross-species transmission mechanisms of
MERS in the Arabian Peninsula [20]. The South Korean
MERS outbreak is a wake-up call emphasizing the need
for flexible epidemiological surveillance systems and
strong public health infrastructure to quickly detect and
stamp out potential outbreaks, including in countries with
no prior MERS experience.
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